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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

6 September 1956

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STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 73-56

SUBJECT: Proposed Revision of DCID 4/5, Priority National Intelligence Objectives, 18 October 1955

REFERENCE: Staff Memorandum No. 21-56 dated 7 March 1956

1. We have attempted to keep the proposed revision to DCID 4/5 to a minimum in conformance with the general principle that substantial annual revisions in what purports to be a long range document should not be necessary. Furthermore, NSCID 4, as revised on 29 August 1956, authorizes the DCI to "select from time to time and on a current basis sections and items of such an outline (DCID 4/5) which have a priority interest." Thus, NSCID 4 takes care of the current ups and downs in priorities, and permits DCID 4/5 to concentrate more exclusively on the more timeless and basic criteria affecting a country's importance to US security.

2. The attached changes fall into three general categories:

a. Those which take account of the new Soviet diplomatic, political, and economic tactics, particularly in the underdeveloped and uncommitted areas.

b. Those which change the priority category of some countries on the basis of long-range basic importance rather than of current developments (i.e.: paras. II p on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and III c on India);

c. Several minor changes designed primarily for clarification.

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Chief, Estimates Staff

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DOCUMENT NO. 23
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 11/1/56
DATE: 9/21/56

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Specific Recommendations for Revision

I. FIRST PRIORITY OBJECTIVES

No change recommended.

II. SECOND PRIORITY OBJECTIVES

b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to weaken and disrupt (the NATO alliance)* US alliances, (or) to foment antagonism between the Western powers and (Asian powers) the rest of the free world and to extend the area of Soviet influence and control in non-Communist states.

Comment: The current Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive is directed toward all US alliances and the extension of Soviet influence particularly in the former colonial states. The suggested changes highlight the broad focus of Soviet political objectives. It is believed that the phrase "including economic policies and actions" adequately embraces the current Soviet trade and aid offensive. (Ref: IAC-D-50/10-1 Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives).

* Sections in parentheses are recommended for deletion; underlined sections recommended as new additions.

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- e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses substantially affecting Soviet military, economic, and political capabilities, with particular reference to any development which could quickly upset the international balance of military power.

Comment: An optional addition which highlights the technological breakthrough possibility.

- p. The political, economic, and military strengths and weaknesses of non-Communist regimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Recommendation: Downgrade to priority three following paragraph b.

Comment: The South Korean and Chinese Nationalist regimes (paragraphs III a and b) are considered under third priority objectives. It is believed that the importance of the situation in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is generally on the same order of priority.

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q. The reactions of the governments and peoples of (South and) Southeast Asia to developments in Communist China's power position (developments in Indochina) and to the general threat of further Communist aggrandizement in the region; the strength and political orientation of neutralist forces; strength and cohesiveness of regional groupings, particularly the SEATO alliance; Communist political and subversive capabilities in those countries and the area's vulnerability to Bloc political and economic inducements.

Comment: Downgrade to Category III for the reasons mentioned in paragraph p. above. The adjustment of non-Communist Asian powers to Communist China's growing power potential and the strength and orientation of neutralist forces are considered of more lasting importance than reactions to "developments in Indochina". The reference to SEATO has been extended to encompass any regional groupings, neutralist, pro-Western or pro-Communist. South Asia has been omitted because India and Pakistan are separately covered (see II r and III d below).

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
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- r. New paragraph under Far East (including Southeast Asia)
as follows:

The stability and orientation of India, (policy of the Indian government) with particular reference to its position in the global balance of power, its relations with Communist China and the USSR, (and) its attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia, and the progress of economic development.

Recommendation: Upgrade paragraph III c on India from a third to a second priority objective.

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- s. The stability (and), policies, and orientation of the Arab (league) states, Iran and Israel with particular reference to the security of oil concessions, base agreements, and other commitments to the West; the possibility of Arab-Israeli hostilities (Middle East defense plans); and (both external and internal Communist influence and capabilities) vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda and subversion and Bloc political and economic inducements.

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Comment: The proposed addition takes account of the increasing pressure on Western concessions and base agreements as well as increased Bloc activity in the area. Note also that this area will be in Category II, whereas all of non-Communist South Asia and the Far East [REDACTED] are in Category III. This is perhaps the most important substantive revision for the Board to discuss.

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III. THIRD PRIORITY OBJECTIVES

- b. Political and economic stability of the Chinese Nationalist regime with particular reference to (and) its objectives and intentions toward Communist China and the US and its ability to resist Communist pressures and inducements; Communist subversive capabilities on Taiwan.

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Comment: Revision recognizes the problem of growing Communist subversive capabilities.

- d. The stability of the governments of Pakistan, (Iran) Afghanistan, and Burma, with particular reference to Communist influence and capabilities.

Comment: It is recommended above that Iran be included in paragraph II s as closely affected by the problem of Western concessions and base agreements in the Middle East. The stability of Pakistan has become of increasing importance to US interests.

- dl. New paragraph under Far East (the Near East) South Asia and Africa.

The stability and policies of independent African states with particular reference to the extent of Communist and other anti-Western influences throughout Africa.

Comment: Paragraph II s is oriented toward the Arab league countries and omits such countries as Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia and Liberia. The increase of Communist, Moslem, and Indian influence in Africa is of growing concern.

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- h. The Cyprus issue, particularly its effect on the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean (and on the Balkan Alliance) on Greek stability and on Greek and Turkish relations with NATO and the US.

Comment: Revision places US concerns with the Cyprus issue in better focus.

- i. Anti-American sentiment in Iceland and political (opposition to) policies toward NATO and the continued presence of the US-manned NATO airbase at Keflavik; also extent of Communist influence in the government, trade union movement and economy.

Comment: Former wording has been overtaken by events.

- l. Eliminate on the grounds that: (a) these factors are specifically mentioned in the appropriate countries or areas; and (b) these factors should have the same priority category as the countries in which they are present.

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